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As increased cyber related incidents continue to be noted and 
documented in Kenya, as a result of the rapid deployment of the fiber 
optic cable [1], the need to setup proactive detection tools for use by 
Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRTs) becomes more evident. 
CIRTs act as Police stations where cyber related security incidents are 
reported and recorded. Such teams, especially in institutions with high 
speed fiber optic connections, should have the mandate of coordinating 
response; managing cyber security incidents within their districts of 
jurisdiction and collaboration with partnering institutions. Numerous 
reports showing a steady increase in cyber related incidences that easily 
qualify as cyber crimes, yet crime is still being looked at in the traditional 
sense in terms of something that is against the law. Modern societies 
generally regard crimes as offences against the public or the state, as 
distinguished from torts - wrongs against private parties that can give 
rise to a civil cause of action [2].  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Cyber security; General State of affairs  
Cyberspace and related technologies have eroded society’s 
ability to enforce criminal laws as they apply to attacks on 
communications between computers, on data stored on computers and 
on real world systems controlled by computers [3]. This is because these 
technologies have contributed immensely to the introduction and spread 
of cyber crimes. Cybercrimes are a type of crime that involves the abuse 
of information technology. The term cybercrime covers a series of crimes 
which range from cyber terrorism to industrial espionage. Cybercrimes 
are thus extensive phenomenon expressed via of an intricate ecosystem 
of operators, victims and instruments [3]. Cybercrime is a criminal 
phenomenon centered on the abuse of information technology, and its 
manifestations range from cyber terrorism to industrial espionage [4]. 
Cybercrime today is a particularly extensive and complex phenomenon 
expressed via an intricate ecosystem of operators, victims and 
instruments which, over the years, has acquired a complex 
organizational hierarchy all over the world. Cyberfraud which is a 
subcomponent of cybercrimes differs from other cybercrimes, because of 
the undue profits enjoyed by the fraudster, gained by illegally 
manipulating IT systems, or for other peculiarities based on the 
legislation in force in the various countries. In 2010, the European 
Electronic Crime Task Force decided to explore the dynamics of 
Cyberfraud at European level [4]. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Type of Honeypot on network 
14.3% of respondents indicated running Physical HoneyPots, 
1.4% indicated running Virtual HoneyPots, while 84.3% were running 
neither HoneyPots. HoneyPots are yet to penetrate the various 
constituencies. 
Table 1: Type of Honeypot on network 





Valid Physical 10 14.3 90.9 90.9 
Virtual 1 1.4 9.1 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.2 Number of Honeypots deployed and running 
12.9% of respondents indicated running two or less 
HoneyPots, while 1.4% of the respondents were running 3-5, or 6 and 
greater HoneyPots. 84.3% were running none. HoneyPots are, once again 




With the advent of the ever changing technology and the intense sophistication 
in methods and means of committing illegal activities, crime is no longer narrowly defined 
vies-a-vie the law but there is need to be able to handle technologically oriented crimes 
commonly referred to as Cybercrimes. Cybercrimes are crimes that involve the use of 
computers to undertake illegal. Collection of statistics associated with cybercrimes can be 
quite tricky and daunting, since their collection and tabulation can only be done when 
aggrieved parties report them. Some of these illegal activities that constitute cybercrimes 
include, but not limited to, creation of counterfeit currency or official documents using 
computer scanners and graphics programs, embezzlement of funds using computers to 
skim very small sums of money from a large number of accounts, distribution of child 
pornography on the Internet, and theft of digital property. Other crimes that can also be 
committed include fraud, hate crimes, stalking, gambling, hacking; spread of malware, 
phishing, spamming, Botnet attacks, DDoS attacks, espionage and money laundering. In this 
paper we present results on usability of HoneyPots in KENET member institutions in 
western Kenya as proactive detection tools for monitoring cyber related incidences. 
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Table 2: Number of Honeypots deployed and running 





Valid <=2 9 12.9 81.8 81.8 
3 - 5 1 1.4 9.1 90.9 
>= 6 1 1.4 9.1 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.3 Number of Honeypots deployed and running 
14.3% of respondents running HoneyPots indicated that their 
HoneyPots Often received suspicious activity, while 1.4% indicated that 
their HoneyPots So Often received suspicious activity.  
Table 3: Honeypot recorded suspicious activity 





Valid Often 10 14.3 90.9 90.9 
So Often 1 1.4 9.1 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.4 Kind of honeypot imitated 
Table 4: Kind of honeypot imitated 







9 12.9 81.8 81.8 
Personal 
HoneyPots 
2 2.9 18.2 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.5 Primary reason for running HoneyPot 
12.9% of respondents running HoneyPots indicated that their 
primary reason for running their HoneyPot was monitor malware 
threats, 1.4% for Research on threats and securing their networks 
respectively.  







Valid Research on 
threats 
1 1.4 9.1 9.1 
Securing the 
network 




9 12.9 81.8 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.6 Major challenges in running HoneyPots 
1.4% of respondents running HoneyPots indicated that the 
major challenges they faced as they run HoneyPots was lack of qualified 
staff to handle the HoneyPots, while 14.3% of respondents running 
HoneyPots indicated that they faced no challenges.  







Valid Qualified staff 
to handle 
Honeypots 
1 1.4 9.1 9.1 
None 10 14.3 90.9 100.0 
Total 11 15.7 100.0  
Missing System 59 84.3   
Total 70 100.0   
3.7 Reasons for NOT running a HoneyPot in your LAN setup 
84.3% of respondents that do not run HoneyPots indicated 
that they do not run them for the following reasons. 24.3% were not 
aware of Honeypots existence, 15.7% indicated a lack of skills to 
interpret HoneyPot traffic, 14.3% felt HoneyPots were a Security risk if 
compromised, 11.4% indicated budgetary constraints, 10% cited a lack 
of technical staff to handle them, while 8.6% felt their data centers had 
poor infrastructure to allow for setup of such equipment.  
Table 7: Reasons for not running a HoneyPot in your LAN setup 
 Frequency % Valid % 
Cumulative 
% 
Valid Lack of 
technical staff 
7 10.0 11.9 11.9 
Lack of 
awareness 
17 24.3 28.8 40.7 
Budgetary 
Constraints 




6 8.6 10.2 64.4 
They are a 
security risk 
10 14.3 16.9 81.4 
Lack of skills 
to interpret 
traffic 
11 15.7 18.6 100.0 
Total 59 84.3 100.0  
Missing System 11 15.7   
Total 70 100.0   
3.8 Malware domain list is our external source providing information 
on our domain 
64.3% of the respondents indicated that Malware domain 
list was their external source for providing information on malicious or 
problematic URLs, IPs or Domains. 35.7% of the rest of respondents felt 
otherwise.  
Table 8: Malware domain list is our external source providing 
information on our domain 
 Frequency % Valid % 
Cumulative 
% 
Valid Yes 45 64.3 64.3 64.3 
No 25 35.7 35.7 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.9 SpamCop is our external source providing information on our 
domain 
20% of the respondents indicated that SpamCop was their 
external source for providing information on malicious or problematic 
URLs, IPs or Domains, while 80% of other respondents indicated 
otherwise.  
Table 9: SpamCop is our external source providing information on 
our domain 





Valid Yes 14 20.0 20.0 20.0 
No 56 80.0 80.0 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.10 Cert.br data feed is our external source providing information 
on our domain 
  7.1% of the respondents indicated that Cert.br data feed was 
their external source for providing information on malicious or 
problematic URLs, IPs or Domains, while 92.9% of other respondents 
indicated otherwise. 
Table 10: Cert.br data feed is our external source providing 
information on our domain 





Valid Yes 5 7.1 7.1 7.1 
No 65 92.9 92.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.11 Cert.br Spampot is our external source providing information on 
our domain 
10% of the respondents indicated that Cert.br Spampot was 
their external source for providing information on malicious or 
problematic URLs, IPs or Domains, while 90% of other respondents 
indicated otherwise. 
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Table 11: Cert.br Spampot is our external source providing 
information on our domain 





Valid Yes 7 10.0 10.0 10.0 
No 63 90.0 90.0 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.12 NoAH is our external source providing information on our 
domain 
2.9% of the respondents indicated that NoAH was their 
external source for providing information on malicious or problematic 
URLs, IPs or Domains, while 97.1% of other respondents indicated 
otherwise. 
Table 13: NoAH is our external source providing information on our 
domain 





Valid Yes 2 2.9 2.9 2.9 
No 68 97.1 97.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.13 HoneySpider Network is our external source providing 
information on our domain 
5.7% of the respondents indicated that HoneySpider 
Network was their external source for providing information on 
malicious or problematic URLs, IPs or Domains, while 94.3% of other 
respondents indicated otherwise.  
Table 14: HoneySpider Network is our external source providing 
information on our domain 





Valid Yes 4 5.7 5.7 5.7 
No 66 94.3 94.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.14 HoneySpider Network is our external source providing 
information on our domain 
61.4% of the respondents indicated that HoneySpider 
Network was their external source for providing information on 
malicious or problematic URLs, IPs or Domains, while 38.6% of other 
respondents indicated otherwise. 
Table 15: Google safe browsing alerts is our external source 
providing information on our domain 





Valid Yes 43 61.4 61.4 61.4 
No 27 38.6 38.6 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.15 Use of closed sources of information that cannot be disclosed 
27.1% of the respondents indicated that they were using other 
closed sources of information that they could not disclose, while 72.9% 
of other respondents indicated otherwise. 
Table 16: Use closed sources of information that cannot be 
disclosed 





Valid Yes 19 27.1 27.1 27.1 
No 51 72.9 72.9 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.16 Usability of HoneyPots as proactive detection tools for 
monitoring cyber related incidents 
3.16.1 Collection of information on other constituencies 
18.6% of the respondents indicated that they collect 
information about incidents related to other constituencies. 72.9% 




Table 17: Collection of information on other constituencies 
 Frequency % Valid % 
Cumulative 
% 
Valid Yes 13 18.6 18.6 18.6 
No 51 72.9 72.9 91.4 
Not sure 3 4.3 4.3 95.7 
cannot 
tell 
3 4.3 4.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.16.2 Sharing collected information with other players 
25.7% of the respondents indicated that they did share 
collected information with other constituencies, while 74.3% indicated 
otherwise. 
Table 18: Sharing collected information with other players 





Valid Yes 18 25.7 25.7 25.7 
No 52 74.3 74.3 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
3.16.3 Type of information shared 
7.1% of the respondents who shared information collected, 
indicated that they shared mostly types of malware attacks, 2.9% were 
not sure.  
Table 19: Type of information shared 
 
Frequency % Valid % 
Cumulative 
% 
Valid Types of 
Malware 
attacks 
5 7.1 71.4 71.4 
Not sure 2 2.9 28.6 100.0 
Total 7 10.0 100.0  
Missing System 63 90.0   
Total 70 100.0   
3.16.4   Form of information shared  
7.1% of the respondents indicated that they shared the 
information in raw data, 14.3% shared in processed data, while 4.3% 
shared in interpreted data.  
Table 20: Form of information shared 
 
Frequency % Valid % 
Cumulative 
% 
Valid Raw data 5 7.1 27.8 27.8 
Processed data 10 14.3 55.6 83.3 
Interpreted data 3 4.3 16.7 100.0 
Total 18 25.7 100.0  
Missing System 52 74.3   
Total 70 100.0   
 
3.16.5 Conditions for sharing information 
7.1% of the respondents indicated that they shared the 
information under public conditions, while 20% shared under Limited 
accesses.  







Valid Public 5 7.1 26.3 26.3 
Limited 
access 
14 20.0 73.7 100.0 
Total 19 27.1 100.0  
Missing System 51 72.9   
Total 70 100.0   
3.16.6     Missing kind of tools for detecting incidents 
47.1% of the respondent indicated that HoneyPots were the 
kind of tools missing for detecting incidents; 20% indicated IDS/IPS; 
18.6% indicated Internet scanners; 2.9% indicated none, while 10% 
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Valid Honeypots 33 47.1 47.8 47.8 
IDS/IPS 14 20.0 20.3 68.1 
Internet canners 13 18.6 18.8 87.0 
None 2 2.9 2.9 89.9 
Firewalls 7 10.0 10.1 100.0 
Total 69 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 1 1.4   
Total 70 100.0   
 
3.16.7 Kind of information from closed sources 
11.4% of the respondent that use closed sources of 
information indicated proxies’ logs were the kind of information 
provided by their closed sources of information. 4.3% indicated Routers 
routing logs; 4.3% indicated Dbase logs; 2.9% indicated Anti Virus 
engines; while another 2.9% indicated Sandboxes for malware logs.  







Valid Proxies for logs 8 11.4 44.4 44.4 
Routers for 
routing logs 
3 4.3 16.7 61.1 
DBMS for Dbase 
logs 
3 4.3 16.7 77.8 
AV engines for 
virus logs 
2 2.9 11.1 88.9 
Sandboxes for 
malware logs 
2 2.9 11.1 100.0 
Total 18 25.7 100.0  
Missing System 52 74.3   
Total 70 100.0   
 
3.16.8 TOP 3 best sources for gathering information from closed 
sources 












Honeypots 17 24.3 24.3 24.3 
Cuckoo 2 2.9 2.9 27.1 
AV engines 24 34.3 34.3 61.4 
IDS/IPS 5 7.1 7.1 68.6 
Sans Security 
alerts 
19 27.1 27.1 95.7 
Darknets 3 4.3 4.3 100.0 






Honeypots 14 20.0 20.0 20.0 
Cuckoo 7 10.0 10.0 30.0 
AV engines 21 30.0 30.0 60.0 
IDS/IPS 8 11.4 11.4 71.4 
Sans Security 
alerts 
10 14.3 14.3 85.7 
Darknets 10 14.3 14.3 100.0 






Honeypots 30 42.9 42.9 42.9 
Cuckoo 4 5.7 5.7 48.6 
AV engines 13 18.6 18.6 67.1 
IDS/IPS 9 12.9 12.9 80.0 
Sans Security 
alerts 
9 12.9 12.9 92.9 
Darknets 5 7.1 7.1 100.0 
Total 70 100.0 100.0  
This question required the respondents to pick the best three 
sources for gathering information in order of personal priority. The 
tables generated are as indicated above. From the above three tables, the 
average responses was determined to get the final  TOP 3 best sources 
for gathering information as indicated by the respondents. The best were 
identified as Anti Virus engines 31.4%, HoneyPots 21.47% and Sans 




Table 25: Summary of Top 3 Best sources of gathering information 
Source A B C TOTAL AVE 
HoneyPots 24.3% 20.0% 20.0% 64.3% 21.4% 
Cuckoo 2.9% 10.0% 10.0% 22.9% 7.6% 
AV Engines 34.3% 30.0% 30.0% 94.3% 31.4% 
IDS/IPS 7.1% 11.4% 11.4% 29.9% 10.0% 
Sans Security alerts 27.1% 14.3% 14.3% 55.7% 18.6% 
Darknets 4.3% 14.3% 14.3% 32.9% 11.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%  100.0 
 
4. Conclusion 
There is need to conduct a research survey across all 
institutions that are affiliated to KENET as well as all government 
ministries and agencies to determine their preparedness in terms of 
detecting and monitoring cyber related incidents. This will help in 
facilitating a deeper understanding of cyber network traffic within 
KENET infrastructure and the country, and thereby be able to pinpoint 
ways of improving our networks security.  
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